Voit lisätä twiitteihisi sijainnin, esimerkiksi kaupungin tai tarkemman paikan, verkosta ja kolmannen osapuolen sovellusten kautta. Halutessasi voit poistaa twiittisi sijaintihistorian myöhemmin. Lue lisää
A lot of those US-aligned countries are 'under-militarized' sure. Some of them may not enhance American military power or projection much. They may effectively be liabilities (of course some are very much not)... 9/20
...but their US alignment takes that GDP - and thus that potential military capacity, if those economies were ever militarized - off of the table. That, in turn, effects the balancing calculus... 10/20
...because it leaves too few pieces on the board for a direct challenge. The classic example of this must be the Reinsurance Treaty (1887) - by essentially taking Russia 'off the table' Bismark could ensure France would struggle at best to pull together enough allies... 11/20
...to revisit the verdict of 1871 (until they blew it) I'd contend the Romans managed the same thing in Italy from 295 to 218BC and again from 202 to 91BC; it sure wasn't that none of the Italian allies didn't want to break free (see Fronda, Between Rome&Carthage (2010)...12/20
...but absent Hannibal stomping around, after Sentinum, there wasn't enough capacity to band together around the usual discontents (Gauls, Samnites) to make balancing feasible. Roman missteps created a situation in 91BC where that was no longer true - like we're doing now 13/20
The value of NATO - of most of the US-aligned security agreements, formal and informal - is thus less what they do for us, as what they are *not* doing, in our interest. By taking so many potential powerful potential disruptors 'off the table'...14/20
...and binding their interests (to continue to prosper without undue conflict or security burdens) to our interests (to continue to manage the broad sweep of global affairs), we inhibit balancing, and ideally close the door to increased peer-competition. 15/20
NATO, which essentially takes a fifth of the global GDP 'off the table' in this way, obviously serves a purpose within that framework, even if it did nothing else (and it can, in fact, do other things for all its members)... 16/20
None of which is to say that the USA, NATO and the USA's other security partners shouldn't be having a hard rethink about what the relationship is for and how it should best be structured for that new reality. Of course we should.... 17/20
But I'd say that NATO provides value worth the cost even when it does *nothing at all.* Now that's a hard sell for the American voter, to be sure. But I don't think it is an impossible sell - should someone want to sell it, and I'd like to see it tried... 18/20
Alternately, we can stick with the current plan, which is 'under/mis-inform the American public, conduct security policy in obscurity wherever possible, and act surprised when we get a fool-isolationist who objects to policies we never bothered to build public support for.' 19/20
...a plan on vivid display with the recent Afghanistan papers. Or, maybe we can try coming up with a overall strategy, explaining it *clearly* to the voters and congress, getting approval for it, so that regular folks understand what something like NATO is for. end/20
I come off harsher than I mean to sound to the Net Assessment podcast folks - their discussion is, I think, well informed and very useful - I am heartbroken that @ConsWahoo is leaving the podcast. Do give it a listen, link at the top of the thread.
end+1/20.
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