Voit lisätä twiitteihisi sijainnin, esimerkiksi kaupungin tai tarkemman paikan, verkosta ja kolmannen osapuolen sovellusten kautta. Halutessasi voit poistaa twiittisi sijaintihistorian myöhemmin. Lue lisää
Sometimes that control was through clients or intermediaries, sometimes it was direct, but control was the goal and there was largely the assumption that a permanent military presence would be required. 6/11
That is, limited wars where you might achieve near-total military victory (e.g. Franco-Prussian) but settle for limited objectives - that kind of war was the product of a culture/discourse consensus. A hot-house flower which did not live in the wild. Thus, ritualized. 7/11
Trying to apply the 'exit strategy' to wars outside of the ritualized European formula is thus a new endeavor, and as likely to succeed as getting the Gauls to wait until after your ritual sacrifices. Why should the Taliban volunteer to lose to save your rituals? 7/11
In my view: good policy should *assume* that exit is difficult and there will always be complications. Supposedly 1941-5 was the good war, supposedly with an exit strategy, **but we haven't exited Germany or Japan yet!!** 8/11
So the correct policy assumption: assume any boots-on-the-ground action will require a permanent military presence (perhaps a small one) for at least 75 years. Do your cost-benefit on action on that basis. If it isn't worth 75 years, it isn't worth the initial action. 9/11
None of which is to say I don't think the conversation there isn't a good one - it is. We *should* have a clear idea of what our end goals are, and those end goals *should* - indeed *must* be clearly articulated to the public so that it knows what it is signing up for. fin/11
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