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https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/strategy-and-exit-strategies-essential-or-misleading/ … A good discussion on exit strategies, though I think it is somewhat hindered by the fact that the analytical framework being used really extends no earlier than 1800. That's a problem because it keeps them from realizing how novel the problem is. 1/11
There is a desire to return to a Clausewitzian strategic mold - Chris Preble (I think) makes this point explicitly - which repudiates the expense of long-term occupation of territory. But a longer historical view - on that stretches back before 1800... 2/11
And encompasses more of the world rapidly reveals that Clausewitz' eye-on-the-door was really applicable within the context of intra-European warfare, precisely because the 'rules' of that kind of warfare permitted it....3/11
We don't usually talk or think about early modern/modern intra-European warfare as being ritualized (the way we talk about, say, ancient Greek warfare) but it *was.* That enabled the sort of wars Clausewitz (or this reading of him) envisages, at least in Europe. 4/11
But, of course - and this is my main point here - OUTSIDE of Europe, war continued without the ritual layer much as it had for a thousand years: there were no exit strategies *because the strategy was never to exit.* The goal was permanent territorial control. 5/11
Sometimes that control was through clients or intermediaries, sometimes it was direct, but control was the goal and there was largely the assumption that a permanent military presence would be required. 6/11
That is, limited wars where you might achieve near-total military victory (e.g. Franco-Prussian) but settle for limited objectives - that kind of war was the product of a culture/discourse consensus. A hot-house flower which did not live in the wild. Thus, ritualized. 7/11
Trying to apply the 'exit strategy' to wars outside of the ritualized European formula is thus a new endeavor, and as likely to succeed as getting the Gauls to wait until after your ritual sacrifices. Why should the Taliban volunteer to lose to save your rituals? 7/11
In my view: good policy should *assume* that exit is difficult and there will always be complications. Supposedly 1941-5 was the good war, supposedly with an exit strategy, **but we haven't exited Germany or Japan yet!!** 8/11
So the correct policy assumption: assume any boots-on-the-ground action will require a permanent military presence (perhaps a small one) for at least 75 years. Do your cost-benefit on action on that basis. If it isn't worth 75 years, it isn't worth the initial action. 9/11
None of which is to say I don't think the conversation there isn't a good one - it is. We *should* have a clear idea of what our end goals are, and those end goals *should* - indeed *must* be clearly articulated to the public so that it knows what it is signing up for. fin/11
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