Oatmeal Agitante

Isn't it likely that differences in the physical implementations of the two brains would have some effect on the odds?

If there were *two* synchronised copies of the prototype brain acting out exactly the same process, in front of you, would you still expect it to be 50:50. No, you would expect the odds of being one of the clones to be 2:1.

What if you smooshed those two synthetic brains together so that they were one object with twice as many neurons? What if the other brain was just heavier, or used more energy? Doesn't it seem likely that these things might lead to a greater magnitude of subjective existence?

(And if it seems likely that something would raise the odds, does it not, then, raise the odds?)

But how *would* those variations in physical implementation effect the odds? We have no way of determining that empirically! This is the mystery that so many of our friends have denied, and I don't think we can deny it any more!

Here, we have an example of a plausible scenario in which an agent's survival is contingent on making a prediction about subjectivity's relation to matter. That means that the concept of subjective measure is not a spook, it is something we *must* coherently account for.

Metaphysicians call the degree to which any physical system experiences its existence, "anthropic measure". I have been calling the difficulty of estimating anthropic measure from matter "the anthropic measure concentration problem."

It seems intractable, but my current heuristic is `relative measure = (mass-energy*integrated information)/entropy`