why is tls having a MAC in the finished message instead of a HASH if it's encrypted/authenticated already?
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Also, I guess you don't have to worry about any kind of known plaintext attack on the finished message when its content is derived from kex.
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In general such (psuedo-)randomization should make some proofs easier. YOu might check if TLS 1.3 security proofs rely on it.
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I briefly worked on a proposal to make it possible to implement TLS w/o HMAC at all, e.g. if you were using AES-CMAC for record protection…
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…& I remember noticing that TLS uses HMAC in cases that don't make sense if we're otherwise using AES-CMAC. Would've been an uphill battle.
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