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BRIAN_____'s profile
Brian Smith
Brian Smith
Brian Smith
@BRIAN_____

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Brian Smith

@BRIAN_____

Code farmer. Security, crypto, performance, networking, usability. Rust, C++, C, Haskell, DSLs, etc. *ring*, webpki, crypto-bench, mozilla::pkix.

Honolulu & San Francisco
briansmith.org
Joined April 2008

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    1. Kenn White‏Verified account @kennwhite Nov 16

      Kenn White Retweeted Jim Perrin

      It's not TLS 1.3. It's a Frankenhack that uses "longer-lived static Diffie-Hellman keys that are re-used across multiple sessions", which is explicitly NOT allowed in 1.3. Not sure the advantage over just using 1.2, and it will break a lot of gear.https://twitter.com/BitIntegrity/status/1063451241257345024 …

      Kenn White added,

      Jim Perrin @BitIntegrity
      So wait, they took TLS 1.3, disabled the good bits, and put a fresh coat of paint on it? https://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-releases-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management … hey @kennwhite, could I trouble you for your opinion on this?
      3 replies 16 retweets 39 likes
    2. Thomas H. Ptacek‏ @tqbf Nov 16
      Replying to @kennwhite

      I haven’t looked carefully, but what does this construction break?

      1 reply 0 retweets 2 likes
    3. Kenn White‏Verified account @kennwhite Nov 16
      Replying to @tqbf

      still working my way through it, but there's an entire appendix on "Requirements for an eTLS Aware client"

      2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes
    4. Kenn White‏Verified account @kennwhite Nov 16
      Replying to @kennwhite @tqbf

      and also, I'm only marginally optimistic about first-gen basic implementation correctness of actual 1.3 in the best case. Not a lot of confidence in the Blue Coats of the world with this thing.https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/27/blue_coat_chokes_on_chrome_encryption_update/ …

      2 replies 0 retweets 2 likes
    5. Thomas H. Ptacek‏ @tqbf Nov 16
      Replying to @kennwhite

      I guess I’m just curious how static DH might cause compat problems. I understand why TLS 1.3 true believers hate it.

      1 reply 0 retweets 2 likes
    6. Stephen Checkoway‏ @stevecheckoway Nov 16
      Replying to @tqbf @kennwhite

      My understanding earlier in the standardization process was that nothing prohibits a static DH. There's no real way for a client to tell that it happens. (This eTLS stuff has some visibility requirements, except when it doesn't.)

      1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
    7. Kenn White‏Verified account @kennwhite Nov 16
      Replying to @stevecheckoway @tqbf

      I could be completely wrong about peers' state machines chugging along without hiccup when presented with duplicate keys, but I can also envision an entire Hanno mini-series on all the amazingly stupid ways that things fail.

      2 replies 0 retweets 1 like
    8. Thomas H. Ptacek‏ @tqbf Nov 16
      Replying to @kennwhite @stevecheckoway

      Shouldn’t the server’s DH key be pretty much opaque to a client?

      1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
    9. Matthew Green‏ @matthew_d_green Nov 16
      Replying to @tqbf @kennwhite @stevecheckoway

      There were half-baked proposals to have clients detect repeated DH public keys and barf.

      2 replies 0 retweets 3 likes
    10. Thomas H. Ptacek‏ @tqbf Nov 16
      Replying to @matthew_d_green @kennwhite @stevecheckoway

      Those are from TLS 1.3 people who are deliberately breaking compat to break the enterprise monitoring use case, right?

      2 replies 0 retweets 1 like
      Brian Smith‏ @BRIAN_____ Nov 16
      Replying to @tqbf @matthew_d_green and

      ServerHello.Random could be the ECDH private key, encrypted w/ shared secret, and everything would work fine for both use cases, for typical ECDH key sizes. And/or one could build a similar thing directly on top of the "randomness improvement" draft mechanism w/ a random Random.

      10:56 AM - 16 Nov 2018
      • 1 Retweet
      • MSP
      1 reply 1 retweet 0 likes
        1. New conversation
        2. Brian Smith‏ @BRIAN_____ Nov 16
          Replying to @BRIAN_____ @tqbf and

          That's just 2 minutes of thinking. No doubt there are "better" ones. Seems unrealistic to expect to prevent the server from leaking the ECDH key to something it trusts, in a scalable way that depends only on out-of-band shared key + the bytes on the wire. What's the exact goal?

          1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
        3. Stephen Checkoway‏ @stevecheckoway Nov 16
          Replying to @BRIAN_____ @tqbf and

          Goal for whom? Enterprises: decrypt data by man-on-the-side boxes. TLS WG: prevent exactly that. Matt: provide a visible, standardized mechanism to do it so enterprises don’t do exactly the sort of thing you propose.

          1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
        4. Brian Smith‏ @BRIAN_____ Nov 16
          Replying to @stevecheckoway @tqbf and

          The "prevent exactly that" group. I get the impression they're less interested in preventing "enterprise" stuff and more interested in preventing government-scale use of that stuff. There's lots of reasons one can't prevent, technologically, the "enterprise" use cases.

          1 reply 0 retweets 2 likes
        5. Matthew Green‏ @matthew_d_green Nov 16
          Replying to @BRIAN_____ @stevecheckoway and

          Once enterprise builds the systems and gets their revisions into every Blue Coat middlebox, half the engineering work of those abusive governments is done.

          2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes
        6. Brian Smith‏ @BRIAN_____ Nov 16
          Replying to @matthew_d_green @stevecheckoway and

          Yeah, that's what I'm trying to say. And, to be honest, the design & implementation of even an impossible-to-detect mechanism is not hard.

          1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
        7. Kenn White‏Verified account @kennwhite Nov 16
          Replying to @BRIAN_____ @matthew_d_green and

          how do you get around the CA problem? I'd think a stealth intermediary would get flagged pretty quickly by Mountain View.

          1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
        8. Brian Smith‏ @BRIAN_____ Nov 16
          Replying to @kennwhite @matthew_d_green and

          Like I mentioned earlier in this thread, if you want to share a static key but you need the ECDH key to change every connection, you can do that by making the ECDH key a function of the static key and Server.Random.

          1 reply 0 retweets 3 likes
        9. Brian Smith‏ @BRIAN_____ Nov 16
          Replying to @BRIAN_____ @kennwhite and

          If we wanted to prevent this kind of thing, then we would have tried to find a way to make the protocol secure by making Server.Random deterministic, and get people to insist on that variant of TLS. (Even now, given the use of ephemeral DH, does Server.Random need to be random?)

          1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
        10. 8 more replies

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