Not saying *everyone in media* spreads disinfo, but I am sure it is frustrating to compete with outlets that spread disinformation at scale and drive stories in news cycles that you then have to cover.
-
-
To take the premise of the question, I will be specific. Sustained coverage the WikiLeaks hack in 2016 provided the type of amplification to the influence operation that made it catastrophically successful.
@datasociety’s work on the oxygen of amplification is relevant here.0 replies 2 retweets 8 likes -
Replying to @kevinroose @GrahamBrookie and
Moscow doesn’t make that distinction, it’s part of the same doctrine for them. esp given that most material from hack/leak can’t be verified (GRU manipulated at least some in 2016), question use of such info indiscriminately & esp w/o context for readers of provenance & veracity.
0 replies 0 retweets 2 likes -
Replying to @kevinroose @GrahamBrookie and
Ah but the true part is impossible to verify in most hack/release efforts. That’s my point. And as graham points out on adverse incentives, our adversaries know some publishers will weight newsworthy over whether it can be verified as true
0 replies 0 retweets 2 likes -
Replying to @kevinroose @GrahamBrookie and
How exactly were the Wikileaks materials from the DNC and podesta hacks verified? The campaign did not do so, nor did the DNC.
7 replies 2 retweets 4 likes
Some of them could be verified by virtue of the DKIM signatures included in at least some of the emails in the dumps. Not that a lot of news orgs did so.
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.