@rootkovska Why would it? SE are specially designed to prevent extradition of sensitive data, logically and physically.
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Replying to @Serianox_
@rootkovska Again, why is it less secure than storing the keys on the same chip, even in TEE? cf. iPhone storing fingerpts in the companion.1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @Serianox_
@Serianox_ The fundamental question is: do I have control over the code that runs on the processor which handles my private key?2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @rootkovska
@Serianox_ ... in case of the USB Armory I do, in case of some obscure, tamper-proof uC I don't.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @rootkovska
@rootkovska And I assume you do have access to the i.MX53 ROM bootloader…1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @Serianox_
@Serianox_ Yes: https://github.com/inversepath/usbarmory/wiki/Internal-Boot-ROM … /cc@AndreaBarisani1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @rootkovska
@rootkovska@AndreaBarisani Didn't know this detail. :) Still, doesn't prove that you have full control over the i.MX53.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @Serianox_
@rootkovska@AndreaBarisani I always assume hardware is designed in good faith, but never put trust in it, e.g. bugs happen.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
@Serianox_ @rootkovska even one more reason to have less useless hardware around you and stick to minimal and audited designs
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