I use probability heuristics to put my opponent on a range of arguments and then game theory to randomly determine how frequently to attribute each argument to them. My own arguments are a binary range of extremely strong and extremely weak arguments, to keep them guessing.
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Replying to @PereGrimmer
You're forgetting folding equity: a bad argument pressed aggressively enough just becomes an incomprehensible or unfalsifiable argument, therefore obfuscating my actual range.
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Replying to @PereGrimmer
Not if my argument strategy is actually GTO, no. Optimally, you should be indifferent to engaging or not engaging my arguments if my ranges are properly selected.
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Replying to @PereGrimmer
If you engage every argument then I have successfully tricked you into wasting substantial portions of your time. Not just that, this is a literally infinite hole; I could theoretically exploit it to waste infinite time.
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Replying to @PereGrimmer
Well in that case the game is non-zero sum. However, since a zero-sum variant of the game exists and it's impossible to know with certainty which version I am playing with any given person, my strategy still makes sense.
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I'd have to be able to detect it with sufficient frequency to justify the modification, and I don't have enough experience or competence to assess what frequency that would be. Doing so would also introduce the possible exploit of switching between games. Also I'm just lazy.
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