One thing that stood out about the report was that the flavour was very different to the previous one. A few of the noticeable changes were:
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THREAD ON UN ANALYTICAL SUPPORT AND SANCTIONS MONITORING TEAM’S 12th REPORT ON #AFGHANISTAN
I found the latest UN report to be interesting for a number of reasons.
Some good, others not.
Report available 
https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2021%2F486&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop …
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1. The report is more reserved when speculating on Taliban cohesion. It no longer seems to adopt the language of an imminent break or fragmentation. Yes, it still overemphasises internal jockeying for resources + influence as signs of potential breaks, but overall realistic.pic.twitter.com/UaHhn0Hhan
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2. The assessment of Al Qaeda and Taliban relations is slightly different. While the report still claims close cooperation and imputes bad faith in their dealings with international partners, it lacks “bold” claims of the previous reports.pic.twitter.com/WCSYOcopht
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Anyone remember reports of Zawahiri consulting Yahya Haqqani and Sadr & co meeting with Hamza bin laden? Well, you don’t find such claims in this one.
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3. The language on ISKP and Haqqani nexus is also more nuanced. Unlike the previous report, this one reflects two distinct member state opinions on the matter. Albeit, the report stills prefers the narrative of a possible nexus.pic.twitter.com/31Hz0Yy3sa
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The report contains a new claim however. It states that the Sirajuddin Haqqani is a member of the wider al-Qaeda leadership, although not of the central leadership. To me, that sounds like another one of those stray shots.pic.twitter.com/vZ2Po3sZMh
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The report also seems to be slightly confused in relation to the Taliban’s organisation. For starters, it keeps referring to Siraj as the first depute and Yaqub as the second deputy. It completely forgets about, arguably the most important deputy, Mullah Baradar.pic.twitter.com/6iK1ITGh0g
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Publicly, the Taliban has not differentiated between any of the three deputies, and definitely nothing official to rank one above the others. Given that Mullah Baradar precedes Siraj in being a deputy to an Amir, this ranking doesn’t make any sense.
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The report also has adopted some unique nomenclature when referring to the Taliban’s leadership. It keeps referring to a “Supreme Council” which I assume is a reference to the Rahbari Shura. But then it also refers to a “Leadership Council” which is also dubbed the Quetta Shura.pic.twitter.com/GekNJ4eJKW
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It also refers to a Miran Shah Shura (led by Siraj) and a Peshawar Shura. I would argue that the Peshawar and Quetta Shura are just the two branches of the TB administration which divides AFG into two distinct administrative zones and administer through two distinct bodies.
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These are 2 tier administrative bodies and really have nothing to do with the overall decision making which is distinctly under the Rahbari Shura.
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It is also pointless to call the Rahbari Shura the Quetta Shura given that almost a third of its members are in Doha, and a substantial portion are in Afghanistan, which just over a third of the remaining in Pakistan.
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The word Quetta Shura, which according to the UN doesn’t denote a geographical space (I assume due to Pakistan’s objections to these terms) just appears to be a sign of sticking to old outdated terminology.
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The report also claims that TB stated “Islamic Emirate” is the only option in a 11 April communique. I have never heard the TB make this claim. They seem to have always adopted the “Islamic system” as the only option mantra. But I am open to being corrected on this.pic.twitter.com/8x60bmhkz6
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The only thing I could find on this was the Taliban’s statement following President Biden’s announcement to delay withdrawal. https://alemarahpashto.com/?p=214791
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Dated 15 April, the statement does not say that TB will resume attacks, but that any countermeasures would be due to US breaking ] terms of the agreement. Also, statement does not mention Islamic Emirate but that a “pure Islamic system” as the only possible solution to conflict
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That is not my biggest gripe with the report however. The most controversial claim, IMO, is the report’s estimate of 8,000 to 10,000 foreign fighters being in Afghanistan. Such a claim is not present in previous reports.pic.twitter.com/m5SIEbmpBd
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In the 11th report, only “one member state” reported up to 6,000-6,500 Pakistani fighters (Current report makes similar estimates of 2,500 to 6,000 TTP fighters with only one member state adopting the higher figure). Estimates for other groups all were between a few hundred.
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From that, to jump to a 8,000 to 10,000 estimate seems really unique. Apparently the majority of those are affiliated with the Taliban. I find that weird given that we have almost no evidence of any foreigners whatsoever in Taliban ranks.pic.twitter.com/7BIbnOW2xY
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Those that operate, generally do so through other organisations such as TTP, Lashkar-e Tayyiba etc. This seems like a academic realignment by the UN for post-withdrawal posturing…
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Another way to look at this estimate is by tallying the individual figures provided by the report. - TTP: 2,500 to 6,000 (only one member state adopts the upper range as correct). - ETIM: several hundred. - IMU: up to 700 including family members (big incrse from past figre)
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- KIB: 25 to 150 fighters. AQI: anywhere from several dozen to 500. While the 12th report doesn’t mention some of the other groups, we know from the 11th report the Team’s estimates for some of the other groups. These are: - LeT: 1020 & - Jaish-i-Mohmmad: 230.
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Even by taking the upper range, one is hard pressed to come up with the 8,000 to 10,000 figure!
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Funny that the report adopts a wide margin of error (58,000 to 100,000) when estimating the number Taliban fighters but is much more precise with foreign fighter estimates.
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Intuition would suggest that we can more accurately estimate an open insurgency like the Taliban rather then disparate groups taking extreme measures to hide their numbers and capacity.
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More troubling, the lumping of all these ‘foreign fighters’ is troublesome. The vast majority of these fighters belong are likely to be Pakistani who were driven out of the tribal areas following Pakistani army operations.
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While they may collaborate with groups like AQ, they generally do not harbour regional ambitions and more recently, have taken major steps to limit focus on anti-Pakistan activities.
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