Conversation

to me the hard problem of consciousness feels like newcomb's box problem; it seems really obvious/simple to me and the other people are doing some bizarre overthinking mental moves
20
78
Replying to and
Wow! Spot on! Mary's Room is exactly the thought experiment that—with a little tuning from knowledge to consciousness—divides bonsciousness and consciousness. This reads to me like you're denying the hard problem: If bonsc is "mere contentless self-reference," there's no problem.
1
2
Replying to and
Yep! The current literature doesn't distinguish these two things, but it often implies the hard problem is about consciousness (e.g., that we can't use science to know if jellyfish are conscious). I deny that hard problem. The bonsciousness hard problem hinges on what a 1/2
1
1
hard problem entails. Does it require there to be anything on the other side of the problem? Any content in the solution? I like that definition, so I don't think there's a hard problem. However, if there can be ~nothing in the solution, just self-reference, sure, it exists. 2/2
1